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Abstract. In this paper, we formalize the notion of distributed sensitive
social networks (DSSNs), which encompasses networks like enmity net-
works, financial transaction networks, supply chain networks and sexual
relationship networks. Compared to the well studied traditional social
networks, DSSNs are often more challenging to study, given the privacy
concerns of the individuals on whom the network is knit. In the current
work, we envision the use of secure multiparty tools and techniques for
performing privacy preserving social network analysis over DSSNs. As a
step towards realizing this, we design efficient data-oblivious algorithms
for computing the K-shell decomposition and the PageRank centrality
measure for a given DSSN. The designed data-oblivious algorithms can
be translated into equivalent secure computation protocols. We also list a
string of challenges that are needed to be addressed, for employing secure
computation protocols as a practical solution for studying DSSNs.
1 Motivation
Animosity between colleagues is inevitable and occurs in most organizations.
These personal feelings are known to affect an individual’s professional decisions.
For example, it is well studied that during the formation of teams, employees
tend to choose likable colleagues as co-workers despite their incompetence, rather
than picking a “competent jerk” [1]. In order to better understand employee dy-
namics, the animosity between them can be modeled as a social network, which
we refer to as the enmity network. The network comprises of a set of nodes and
a set of edges, where each node is representative of an employee and an edge
from node A to B depicts the hatred that employee A has for employee B. The
structure of the enmity network provides an overall view of how the employees
relate to one another. Moreover, the importance of a study investigating the
structure of informal networks on the employees, such as the enmity network,
is well established [2]. However, in the case of an enmity network, such a study
is infeasible since the information regarding the network is both distributed and
highly sensitive. The network data is distributed, in the sense that the presence
or absence of an edge from A to B is known only to employee A. Thus, each
employee is aware of only those edges in the network that emanate from the
node corresponding to her. Additionally, the network is sensitive since employ-
ees refrain from disclosing their feelings of hatred and anger, as the professional
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setting in most organizations will consider this unacceptable. It is a must for the
organization to address these feelings, because when ignored these could in turn
manifest as passive-aggression, clearly undesirable for conducive work environ-
ment [3].
Several social networks, apart from enmity networks, pose similar challenges
in their study. The common features across these networks, that make the study
challenging, are that the network data is present in a distributed setting and
that the data is highly sensitive/private an information. We define this class of
social networks as distributed sensitive social networks (DSSNs). Supply chain
networks of organizations, romantic relationships of individuals and the network
of financial transactions between entities are examples of a few social networks
that fall under this category. A detailed discussion on the notion of DSSNs is
provided in Section 4.
A traditional approach adopted for analyzing distributed data is the trusted
third party (TTP) model. This model involves a central trusted authority which
collects information from each individual who has a share of the complete data.
This central authority, known as the trusted third party, aggregates the data
and will either perform the required analysis or release a sanitized version of
the data for analysis. This model has been successfully adopted in studying few
of the social networks, such as online friendship networks, email communica-
tion networks, and collaboration networks. The presence or absence of an edge
in a DSSN is associated with a high quotient of sensitivity. Hence, individuals
holding the network data will be unwilling to disclose their private information
to a trusted third party. The above claim is well supported by the results of a
survey conducted as a part of the current work. A survey on the sensitivity of
personal data was conducted to determine how private do individuals consider
their data. The results of the survey are discussed in Section 4. This renders
the TTP model infeasible as a solution for the analysis of DSSNs, necessitating
for a new methodology to analyze social networks that are both distributed and
sensitive in nature. The current work aims at proposing a new privacy preserving
technique for analyzing distributed sensitive social networks.
2 Problem Statement
We model a distributed sensitive social network as a graph G(V,E), where V is
the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Each node in V is representative of an
individual/organization on whom the network is considered. An edge e ∈ E is
an ordered pair of nodes (u, v), which depicts the private interaction extending
from node u to node v. While modeling DSSNs, we assume that the set V of
vertices is publicly known and that the edges are directed1. The edges of the
1 An undirected graph with bi-directional edges will fall under this definition as well
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graph are considered private, given the sensitive nature of interactions that they
model. Hence, the presence or absence of an edge (u, v) could be private to node
u (as in the case of enmity network) or to both u and v (as in the case of finan-
cial transaction network). The individuals who collectively retain the interaction
information, i.e. the set E of the graph G(V,E), will henceforth be referred to
as parties. Given the distributed nature of a DSSN, we can model a party Pi
to possess as its private information a subgraph Gi(V,Ei), where the edge set
Ei induces a partition Vi of the vertex set and Ei ⊂ E consists of all those
edges (u, v) ∈ E 3′ u ∈ Vi. That is, Ei consists of all those edges in E that lie
within the partition Vi or those emanating from nodes in Vi. In the case of a
DSSN where an edge (u, v) is private to both u and v, then the set Ei will also
include edges (u, v) 3′ v ∈ Vi, as in the case of a financial transaction network.
Ei in this case will additionally have the edges incoming to the partition Vi. The
above definition gives a general picture of how the network data is distributedly
held by the parties. The illustration in Figure 1 depicts a financial transaction
network distributedly held by three parties (in this case banks). It is important
to note that when parties are themselves individuals in the DSSN, the size of
each partition is one i.e. for every i, |Vi| = 1.
Fig. 1. The figure illustrates an example financial transaction network distributedly
held by three parties - Bank I, Bank II and Bank III. The induced partitions are
highlighted in the figure and each partition denotes the bank accounts belonging to a
single bank. An edge (u, v) corresponds to a financial transaction from account u to v.
A study of the structural characteristics of a graph representing a social net-
work is defined as social network analysis (SNA) [4]. Most commonly employed
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SNA techniques include degree distribution, clustering, centrality measures and
community detection [4]. Performing social network analysis on a distributed sen-
sitive social network is akin to running a distributed algorithm A, that takes as
input the graph G(V,E) representing the DSSN. The parties run the algorithmA
distributedly by communicating and coordinating their actions with one another
through passing of messages. However, unlike any regular distributed algorithm,
A must ensure that certain security requirements are met. These requirements
are enlisted below.
Definition 1. (Security Requirements) A distributed algorithm A computes a
network measure m over an input DSSN G(V,E) in a privacy-preserving manner
if the following constraints are met:
(a) Privacy: No party must learn anything more than its input and output to the
algorithm. Intuitively, the exchange of messages between parties, throughout
the run of A, must not compromise any party Pi’s private information (Ei).
(b) Correctness: The output m generated by algorithm A must indeed be the
desired network measure, globally fixed by the parties prior to the run of the
algorithm.
The current work envisions a thorough investigation of the class of under-
explored social networks that we classify as distributed sensitive social networks.
We question the possibility of designing efficient distributed algorithms, de-
scribed in Definition 1, as a privacy preserving approach for performing social
network analysis on DSSNs.
3 Proposed Vision: MPC meets SNA
The question being addressed falls under the broader umbrella of the field of
secure multiparty computation (MPC). Secure computation deals with design-
ing algorithms/protocols so that a set of n parties (or individuals) P1, P2, . . . Pn
having private data x1, x2, ..., xn respectively, can securely compute a public
function f(x1, ..., xn). In our case, the public function f is specific to network
analysis algorithms and the private data is in the form of network interactions.
One can design multiparty computation protocols for different security require-
ments. However, the minimum notion of security guaranteed by the protocols is
that of privacy and correctness, as specified under Definition 1. Besides, secure
computation also accounts for the scenario of collusion involving collaboration
between parties with the ill-intent to learn other parties’ private data and the
possibility of parties deviating from the actual protocol to disrupt the process.
This allows one to design protocols while accounting for the level of security
demanded by the application at hand. For a discussion on the various security
models studied in MPC, we point the reader to the work by Lindell and Pinkas
[5].
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Generic MPC constructions for various security definitions exist to compute
any arbitrary function f securely [6, 7]. However, these constructions are gen-
erally not efficient enough to be put to use in practice. A more sought after
approach is to design function specific efficient MPC protocols. Few application
scenarios that have adopted this approach include auctions [8], benchmarking
[9] and voting [10]. As the vision of the current paper, we propose the following:
“Design of efficient multiparty computation protocols for performing a privacy
preserving social network analysis of distributed sensitive social networks. ”
Designing efficient and secure MPC protocols for analyzing DSSNs requires a
thorough understanding of the state of the art MPC tools and techniques, the
access patterns of network algorithms and a list of requirements/constraints im-
posed by the application scenario. Hence, the current work envisions the amalga-
mation of ideas from two seemingly different domains of research, namely, secure
computation (MPC) and social network analysis (SNA). In the current work, we
also enumerate over the challenges that need to be overcome to use MPC as a
practical solution to study DSSNs.
Our Contribution
In the current paper, we introduce the notion of DSSNs and highlight the need for
studying these less explored networks. We provides a detailed discussion on the
characterization of DSSNs (Section 4). As a step towards realizing the proposed
vision, we design efficient data-oblivious algorithms for two of the widely em-
ployed network analysis methods, namely, the K-shell decomposition algorithm
and the Pagerank centrality measure (Section 6). We discuss on the translation
of these oblivious algorithms into their equivalent MPC protocols (Section 5).
The design of such MPC protocols is just the first step. We list a string of chal-
lenges to be addressed in order to fully realize the proposed vision ( Section
7). These challenges are not limited to the MPC setting, but address the dif-
ferent aspects of the general question of performing privacy preserving analysis
of DSSNs. For completeness, we also enumerate over the marginal research that
has been conducted previously in the intersection of network analysis and MPC
in Section 8.
4 Distributed Sensitive Social Networks
The class of distributed sensitive social networks are characterized by two prop-
erties, namely, the interactions in the network being sensitive and the network
data being distributedly held by a set of parties. Furthermore, the degree of
sensitivity or distributedness varies across DSSNs, a brief discussion on which is
presented next.
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Degree of sensitivity This parameter represents the extent to which the parties
holding the DSSN consider their data private. To capture the gray scale value of
sensitivity of a DSSN modeled as G(V,E), we define a coefficient of sensitivity
µ(G) as the fraction of parties distributedly holding G who are unwilling to share
their private network information with a trusted third party. By definition, the
coefficient µ(G) lies between 0 and 1 and it signifies the extent to which using the
TTP model would fail while studying the graph G. To calculate the sensitivity
coefficient for various DSSNs, we conducted a survey over 160 participants, with
90% of the participants being from the age group 17-22. The targeted age group
is as specified before since it is observed that romantic relationships, crushes,
enmity, etc. are commonly observed interactions across these age groups. The
survey participants were asked whether they will share their private information
(like email transactions, list of close friends, people they dislike and people they
have a crush on) with an external agency, who is collecting this information
for research purposes and guarantees to protect their privacy. A plot containing
sensitivity coefficient of various DSSNs is available in Figure 2. From the plot
we can infer that while friendship, trust and email communication networks fare
lower on the scale of sensitivity, DSSNs capturing enmity, romantic and sexual
relationships are highly sensitive. This also explains why social networks like
friendship and communication have been able to make a digital footprint and
hence are well studied, while many other sensitive social networks continue to
remain in the distributed setting.
Fig. 2. The plot depicts the coefficient of sensitivity for various DSSNs. Abbreviations
used in the plot: Comm: Communication, Trans: Transaction, Reln: Relationship.
Degree of distributedness The extent to which a network is distributedly held
may vary across the networks. A sensitive social network is termed completely
distributed if each party represents a node in the social network. Examples in-
clude the trust network, romantic relationship network and the supply chain
network. At times, the DSSN may be distributedly held by a small set of par-
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ties, such that each party has the network information over a subset of the nodes.
These networks are termed partially distributed sensitive social networks. Exam-
ples include the financial transaction network and the telephone communication
network, where banks and telecommunication companies respectively are the as-
sociated parties.
A discussion on all the DSSNs that have appeared in the research literature
is available in Appendix A.
5 Preliminaries
The paper proposes the design of secure multiparty computation protocols for
performing privacy preserving network analysis. As a step towards realizing the
proposed vision, we design data-oblivious algorithms for two commonly employed
network measures. The current section focuses on introducing the notion of data-
oblivious algorithms and further we discuss on how to translate these oblivious
algorithms to secure MPC protocols with comparable efficiency.
Data-Oblivious Algorithms
An algorithm is termed data-oblivious if its control flow and memory access
pattern do not leak any information about the input other than its length. Ef-
ficient data-oblivious algorithms can be employed for outsourcing computation
[11] and designing secure multiparty protocols [12]. In this paper, we design
data-oblivious network analysis algorithms which reveal nothing but the input
length, which in our case are the number of nodes and the number of edges in
the input graph. Further in this section we present some primitive data types
and programming constructs that will be assumed throughout the paper.
The data-oblivious algorithms designed in the paper assume both integer
and rational data types. A variable named with the symbol ‘tilde’ over it will
represent a rational data value ( For example
∼
a) and a variable without a tilde
will represent an integer. Each data value is classified as public or private, where
a public data value is not considered to be sensitive information. Hence, the con-
trol flow and memory access pattern of a data-oblivious algorithm can depend
on public values as well, along with the input length. In the designed SNA algo-
rithms, public and private values are colored green and red respectively. We also
assume certain primitive operations over integers and rational numbers, includ-
ing addition(+), multiplication(∗), division(/), comparison(>,<) and equality
check(==). The efficiency of a data-oblivious algorithms is evaluated in terms
of the number of primitive operations employed by it.
Performing array accesses (A[i]) over secret indexes (i) is a useful primitive
for designing data-oblivious algorithms. Efficient array accesses over secret in-
dexes can be performed using the Oblivious RAM (ORAM) primitive [13–15].
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Given an n length array A and the index i, the block A[i] can be accessed data-
obliviously using an ORAM in poly.log(n) primitive operations. Henceforth, f(n)
denotes the number of primitive operations employed while reading/writing to
an element in an ORAM of size n. In all the data-oblivious algorithms, an array
stored in the ORAM is colored blue.
The designed data-oblivious algorithms employ two programming constructs,
namely, for and if-else. All the for loops employed are over public variables and
hence the for loop is nothing but a succinct representation of a set of statements
that are repeatedly executed a publicly known number of times. Converting the
non-oblivious if-else construct into its oblivious counterpart has been well stud-
ied in the literature [15]. Intuitively, the if-else construct can be made oblivious
by executing both the branches if and else one after the other, while ensuring
that the effect of only one branch takes place and the other is executed in a
dummy fashion. For the sake of brevity, we use the non-oblivious if-else con-
struct in the designed algorithms, however, they are nothing but an alias for
their oblivious variants.
Translating Data-Oblivious Algorithms to Equivalent MPC Protocols
MPC protocols are generally designed using ideal functionalities, which pro-
vide certain secure primitive operations as building blocks. All the arithmetic
operations over integers can be securely computed using the extended arith-
metic black box (FABB) [16, 17]. The analogous ideal functionality for rational
numbers (
∼
FABB) was introduced by Catrina and Saxena [18]. The ideal func-
tionality for ORAM array accesses (FORAM ) has been well explored in the re-
search literature as well [14, 19]. Hence, there exists equivalent primitive MPC
building blocks for each primitive operation assumed in the data-oblivious al-
gorithms (+, ∗, /,<,>,==). This provides a natural procedure to convert any
data-oblivious algorithm to its equivalent MPC protocol. The security of the
designed protocols will follow from the UC theorem [20] and the fact that the
sequence of primitive operations employed in the designed oblivious algorithm is
predetermined and depends only on public values. Due to space constraint, we
have refrained from elaborating on certain concepts including the security defi-
nition of MPC protocols, the notion of ideal functionalities and the UC theorem.
However, a discussion on them can be found in the work by Damagard et al. [21].
6 Design and Analysis of Data-Oblivious SNA Algorithms
Computing the centrality measure of nodes is a popular network analysis tech-
nique for finding important nodes in a network. However, the notion of im-
portance is dependent on the kind of interactions being modeled as well as the
application scenario under study. Thus, there exist numerous centrality measures
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to rank nodes with respect to different application criteria. In the current sec-
tion, we present data-oblivious algorithms for computing two of the commonly
used centrality measures, K-shell decomposition and Google PageRank.
For each network measure of interest, we first present the most widely em-
ployed algorithm for computing the network measure and discuss on which steps
in each algorithm are non-oblivious to the input graph. Further, we present its
oblivious counterparts designed using primitive black-box operations, as men-
tioned in the Preliminary Section 5. Finally, a discussion on the correctness,
obliviousness and efficiency for each designed protocol is provided.
Oblivious graph data representation
Adjacency list and adjacency matrix are two widely employed graph data rep-
resentations. Since the length of an adjacency list leaks the degree of the corre-
sponding vertex, the adjacency list data structure is unsuitable for the oblivious
setting. While the adjacency matrix is reasonably oblivious (it discloses only the
number of nodes), it is space inefficient. The adjacency matrix is never used in
practice given that most real world network are sparse i.e have |E| = O(|V |).
In this section we propose the edgelist graph representation, a new graph data
structure that outperforms both the adjacency list and adjacency matrix repre-
sentations in the oblivious setting.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 3. The figures represent the different representations of a graph.
Edgelist graph representation The graph G(V,E) (with n = |V | and m = |E|)
is represented using a two tuple (E , Idx), where E is an array of length (m+ 1)
containing concatenated adjacency lists of all nodes and an empty element at
the end. The Idx array, of length n, has an entry corresponding to each node as
defined below:
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Idx[u] =

i if out-degree(u)6= 0 and E[i]
is the first neighbor of u in E
Idx[u+ 1] u 6= n and out-degree(u)= 0
m+ 1 u = n and out-degree(u)= 0
The edgelist graph representation is oblivious to the graph structure and
reveals only the number of nodes and the number of edges in the network. Its
space complexity is (m + n + 1), making it efficient for storing sparse graphs.
All the designed network analysis protocols in this paper assume that the input
graph is represented in the edgelist format and is stored in the ORAM. For the
analogous MPC setting, we do not discuss on how the distributedly held net-
work can be stored in the edgelist representation in the FORAM , since the exact
method adopted will depend on whether the network is completely or partially
distributed. Kukkala et al. [22] discuss on how to store the adjacency matrix of a
distributedly held network in the the FABB . A similar approach can be adopted
for storing the edgelist representation of a network that is distributedly held.
6.1 K-Shell Decomposition Algorithm
As an alternative to density as a measure for cohesiveness of the network, Seid-
man proposed the idea of k-cores that recursively decomposes the network into
cohesive subgraphs known as cores [23]. The basic idea is to recursively construct
the subgraph of a graph such that the measure of cohesiveness increases as we
recurse through. Thus, the process fragments the network into a sequence of
subgraphs such that each is a subgraph of the preceding graph and has higher
cohesiveness. Decomposing the graph into cores also helps in better identifying
the most influential nodes in the network [24]. The innermost core nodes are
known to be influential spreaders of information, diseases, etc. A formal defini-
tion of k-cores and the algorithm to generate them are discussed further.
Definition 2. Given a graph G(V,E), consider the subgraph Gk induced by the
largest vertex set Vk, such that Vk ⊆ V and ∀v ∈ Vk the degree of v in Gk is at
least k. Such an induced subgraph Gk is called the k-core of graph G.
From the above definition, it is clear that we can construct a sequence of sub-
graphs as shown below, where Gi ≤ Gj denotes that the graph Gi is a subgraph
of graph Gj :
Gk ≤ Gk−1 ≤ . . . G2 ≤ G1 ≤ G0 = G(V,E)
Definition 3. Given Gi and Gi+1 are the i and i+1 cores of a graph respectively,
then :
shelli = {v ∈ Gi|v ∈ Gi −Gi+1}
Thus, shelli denotes the set of all nodes in the graph that belong to i-core but
not the (i + 1)-core. This process of decomposing the graph into cores assigns
each node a unique shell number.
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Definition 4. Given a graph G(V,E), For every vertex v ∈ V we define shell(v) =
i if v ∈ shelli, where shelli is as specified in Definition 3.
Batagelj and Zaversnik were the first to propose an efficient technique known
as the K-shell decomposition algorithm [25] that determines the cores of a given
network. The idea of the algorithm is to prune nodes with degree lesser than
a threshold, in each step. The nodes pruned at step i are assigned to shelli
and the graph that remains constitutes the (i+ 1)-core. The process repeats by
considering the (i+ 1)-core. The details of the algorithm are given in the above
pseudocode.
Pseudocode K-shell decomposition
Input: Graph G(V,E) with |V | = n and |E| = m
Output: shell(v), for each v ∈ V
1: V ← sorted list of vertices based on their degree
2: for each v ∈ V in the order do
3: shell(v)← degree(v)
4: for u ∈ Adj(v) do . for all neighbors of vertex v
5: if degree(u) > degree(v) then
6: degree(u)← degree(u)− 1
7: G← G− {v} . Prune vertex v
8: V ← sort vertices based on their degree
We observe that the pseudocode for K-shell has two nested for loops, in steps
2 and 4. The outer one loops over the list of vertices, sorted with respect to degree
and the inner for loops over neighbors of the current vertex. Hence, the number
of times the inner for loop is executed is dependent on the node currently
set to be pruned in the outer loop. This shows that the algorithm is input
graph dependent, making it non-oblivious. In order to make the algorithm data
oblivious, we use the technique of loop coalescing [26], which involves combining
both the loops while guaranteeing the correct functionality of the algorithm. We
provide the oblivious equivalent in Protocol 1. The idea is to coalesce the loops
such that, in each iteration of the coalesced loop, we will either access an element
of the sorted vertex list or access a neighbor of the current node through the edge
list E . To decide which access needs to be performed in the current iteration, we
keep track of two indexes i for indexing elements of sorted list of vertices vert
and j to index over edge list E .
Theorem 1. The proposed Protocol 1 correctly computes the shell number de-
noted by shell(v) ∀ v ∈ V , for the input graph G(V,E).
Proof. In steps 1-3, we initialize a few variables - deg list to maintain the degree
of all nodes; vert list to maintain vertices in the sorted order of their degrees;
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Protocol 1 K-shell decomposition
Input: Graph (E , Idx)
Output: The shell number of each of the nodes v ∈ V denoted by shell(v)
1: deg[i]← 0; ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2: vert[i]← i; ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n
3: bin[i]← 0; ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: deg[i]← Idx[i + 1]− Idx[i]
6: bin[deg[i]]← bin[deg[i]] + 1
7: start← 1
8: for i← 1 to n do
9: temp← bin[i]
10: bin[i]← start
11: start← start + temp
12: vert← oblivious sort (vert, deg)
13: pos[vert[i]]← i, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n
14: i← 1; v ← vert[i]; j ← Idx[v]
15: for iter ← 1 to n + m− 1 do
16: if (j == Idx(v + 1)) then
17: i← i + 1
18: v ← vert[i]; j ← Idx[v]
19: else
20: u← E[j]
21: if (deg[u] > deg[v]) then
22: du← deg[u]; pu← pos[u]
23: pw ← bin[du]; w ← vert[pw]
24: if (uHH== w) then
25: pos[u]← pw; vert[pu]← w
26: pos[w]← pu; vert[pw]← u
27: bin[du]← bin[du] + 1
28: deg[u]← deg[u]− 1
29: j ← j + 1
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bin list is intended to maintain a pointer to the first entry in vert having degree
i,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. In steps 4-6, we compute the degree of each node along with
the number of nodes of a particular degree, which is stored in bin. Using this
information, in steps 7-11 we compute the starting index of nodes of a particular
degree, that terminates the initialization of bin list. In step 12, we sort the list of
vertices in vert with respect to their degree. The assumed data-oblivious sorting
primitive has been well studied in the literature [27, 28]. In step 13, we initialize
a list pos such that pos[i] will store the index of vertex i in the sorted list vert.
The variable i will be used to denote the index to scan over the vert list, and
is initialized to the first element of vert while j will be used to scan over the
edge list E . The variable v denotes the vertex that is currently being pruned.
The for loop in step 15 is the coalesced loop equivalent of the nested loops in
the pseudocode for K-shell. We iterate over the loop (n + m − 1) times, where
the if-else branch at step 16 determines if the current iteration scans over vert
or over the array E . In steps 19-28, we process the neighbor of node v stored in
u. We reduce the degree of u in case it is of a higher degree than v and perform
swap with elements in vert to place u in its correct position after reduction in
degree. The functionality is the same as that achieved by the pseudocode of
K-shell.
Theorem 2. The proposed Protocol 1 for performing K-shell decomposition is
data-oblivious.
Proof. All the arrays/lists - deg, bin, vert, pos, E , Idx are stored in the ORAM.
Hence, the access pattern of these arrays donot leak any information about the
elements being accessed. Apart from accessing elements of the arrays in steps 1-
5, we perform addition and subtraction operations that are assumed as primitive
operations and hence are oblivious. In step 6, we sort the array vert, which can be
performed data-obliviously [27, 28]. In steps 7-10, the for loop runs for a publicly
known number of times, accesses the elements of the bin array sequentially and
uses the primitive addition operation. Hence the sequence of operations remain
the same for a fixed sized input and therefore remain oblivious. Given that the
number of nodes and edges in the graph are publicly known, the loop in step
14 runs for a fixed number of iterations. As described in Section 5, the if-else
construct can be assumed to be data-oblivious.
Theorem 3. The Protocol 1 takes O ((n+m) (f(n) + f(m)) + n(log(n))2) time
complexity, where f(n) denotes the overhead for reading/writing to an element
of ORAM array of size n.
Proof. In steps 1-5 and 7-10, we use O(n) ORAM array accesses over arrays
of size n and hence the complexity would be O(nf(n)) primitive operations.
In step 11, we perform oblivious sorting whose complexity is assumed to be
O(n(log(n))2) [28]. The loop in step 14 is executed (n+m−1) times, where each
iteration employs a constant number of comparison, equality check, addition op-
erations and ORAM accesses. These instructions cost O ((n+m)(f(n) + f(m)))
primitive operations. From this we conclude that the algorithm has a complexity
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of O ((n+m)(f(n) + f(m)) + n(log(n))2)) in terms of the primitive operations
used.
Corollary 1. The Protocol 1 for computing the K-shell decomposition uses O((n+
m) log2(n)) primitive operations assuming the ORAM accesses are performed us-
ing the Circuit ORAM construction.
Proof. The proof of this corollary follows from the fact that using the Circuit
ORAM each block access can be performed in O(log2 n) operations, where n is
the size of the ORAM array.
6.2 PageRank Centrality
Page et al. [29] proposed the PageRank centrality measure to rank the web-
pages using the underlying hyperlink structure. The World Wide Web can be
visualized as a network, with web-pages being the nodes and the hyperlinks
forming the edges. Intuitively, the PageRank defines the importance of a node to
be proportional to the sum of the PageRank centralities of nodes with incoming
links to the considered node. Since its inception, it has been used to find central
nodes in networks including citation networks and social networks [30]. We adopt
the iterative method to compute PageRank, the pseudocode for which has been
described below. The method is briefly described here. All the nodes begin with
an equal share of PageRank value. In each iteration, every vertex distributes its
PageRank value to all its neighbors (out-going links). Further, a fraction (1− s)
of the PageRank values of all the vertices is removed and redistributed to all
the vertices equally. The uniform redistribution of the PageRank value of (1−s)
is performed to ensure that a zero out-degree vertex does not absorb all the
PageRank values. As the number of iterations increase, the PageRank values
will converge.
Let G(V,E) represent the graph of interest.The out-degree of vertex u ∈ V
is represented as od(u).
Definition 5. (Update matrix N) The update matrix for a graph G is denoted
by N = [Nij ] with size n × n, where n = |V |. The entries of the matrix are
defined as follows:
Nij =
{
(s)/od(i) + (1− s)/n if {i, j} ∈ E
(1− s)/n otherwise
Definition 6. (PageRank update rule) Let r
(k)
i represent the PageRank value of
node i after k iterations. The PageRank update rule is defined as follows:
r
(k)
i ←
n∑
j=1
Njir
(k−1)
j
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Pseudocode PageRank algorithm (Adjacency matrix representation)
Input: Graph G(V,E), l (number of iterations), s (redistribution parameter)
Output: The PageRank values for all the vertices in the graph G
1: Compute the matrix N = [Nij ] as specified in Definition 5
2: Intialize r
(0)
i ← 1/n for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
3: for k = 1 to l do
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: r
(k)
i ←
∑n
j=1Njir
(k−1)
j . update PageRank values
The iterative method to compute PageRank is oblivious when the input graph
is represented using the adjacency matrix. As discussed earlier, adjacency matrix
representation is not well suited for sparse graphs. To support a more efficient
graph representation, an equivalent algorithm to compute PageRank for the
case when the input graph is in the adjacency list format is provided below.
This algorithm is non-oblivious since the number of times the for loop in step 5
is executed depends on the degree of all the vertices. The memory accesses on
the entries of the matrix N in step 6 of the algorithm are non-oblivious as well.
Pseudocode PageRank algorithm (Adjacency list representation)
Input: Graph G(V,E), l (number of iterations), s (redistribution parameter)
Output: The PageRank values for all the vertices in the graph G
1: Compute the matrix N = [Nij ] as specified in Definition 5.
2: Initialize r
(0)
i ← 1/n for 1 ≤ i ≤ n (all other r(k) vectors are initialized as zero
vectors for k ≥ 1)
3: for k = 1 to l do
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: for j ∈ Adj(i) do . loop over neighbors of i
6: r
(k)
j ← r(k)j + Nijr(k−1)i
Further we modify the above pseudocode to obtain a data-oblivious PageR-
ank algorithm (Protocol 2) that assumes the edgelist representation for the input
graph. Major techniques employed to convert the pseudocode into its oblivious
counterpart include loop coalescing and the ORAM primitive. Next we present
formal proof of correctness and obliviousness for the designed protocol.
Theorem 4. The proposed Protocol 2 correctly computes the PageRank central-
ity for all the vertices in the input graph G(V,E).
Proof. In steps 1-6, the entries of the update matrix N are computed in accor-
dance with Definition 5. At all times we maintain two PageRank vectors, namely,
∼
r
(0)
and
∼
r
(1)
. One vector is used to update the pagerank in the current iteration,
using the previous pagerank values stored in the other vector. For an odd valued
k, the kth iteration of for loop in step 10 updates the vector
∼
r
(1)
in accordance
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Protocol 2 Oblivious PageRank algorithm (Edgelist representation)
Input: Graph (E , Idx), l (number of iterations), s (redistribution parameter)
Output: The PageRank values for all the vertices in the graph G
1: for i = 1 to n do
2: for j = 1 to n do
3: if Idx[i] == Idx[i + 1] then
4:
∼
N [i][j]← (1− s)/n
5: else
6:
∼
N [i][j]← (s)/(Idx[i + 1]− Idx[i]) + (1− s)/n
7:
∼
r
(0)
[i]← 1/n for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
8:
∼
r
(1)
[i]← 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
9: j ← 1
10: for k = 1 to l do
11: v ← 1
12: for i = 1 to m do
13: if (i == Idx[v + 1]) then
14: v ← v + 1
15:
∼
r
(j)
[E [i]]← ∼r (j)[E [i]] +
∼
N [v][E [i]] ∗ ∼r (1−j)[v]
16: j ← (1− j)
17:
∼
r
(j)
[i]← 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
with the PageRank update rule given in Definition 6, assuming that
∼
r
(0)
stores
the PageRank values computed in the (k−1)th iteration i.e. ∼r (0) = r(k−1). In the
kth iteration when k is even, the roles of
∼
r
(1)
and
∼
r
(0)
will be reversed. The vec-
tor
∼
r
(0)
will be updated in accordance with the PageRank update rule assuming
that
∼
r
(1)
stores the PageRank values computed in the (k − 1)th iteration. The
two nested for loops in steps 4-5 of the pseudocode for Pagerank, previously
non-oblivious, are now coalesced into a single for loop as given in step 12 of
Protocol 2. It is easy to observe that the coalesced for loop in protocol 2 and
the nested for loops in the pseudocode will in total run for m iterations, where
m denotes the number of edges in the graph. The coalesced for loop visits an
edge in each iteration and updates the pagerank of the node to which the edge
points, using the update formula. Hence, the protocol correctly computes the
PageRank values in accordance with the Iterative PageRank method.
Theorem 5. The Protocol 2 for computing the PageRank centrality is data-
oblivious.
Proof. The algorithm is memory trace oblivious given that the arrays N , E , Idx,
r(0) and r(1) are stored in the ORAM. The if -construct in step 3 can be made
oblivious as discussed in preliminaries, Section 5. All the loops are over n, m or
l, all of which are public variables.
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Theorem 6. The Protocol 2 takes O((n2 + lm)f(n2)) primitive operations for
computing the PageRank centrality.
Proof. In steps 1-8 of Protocol 2, we perform O(n2) ORAM accesses over arrays
of size n and n2. Hence the total cost will be O(n2f(n2)) primitive operations.
For each iteration of the for loop on step 10 and step 12, we perform a constant
number of block accesses on ORAM arrays of size m, n and n2 on step 15. Given
that m is the number of edges in the graph and it is upper bounded by n2,
the ORAM overhead for the constant number of accesses is f(n2). The theorem
follows.
Corollary 2. . The Protocol 2 for computing the PageRank centrality uses O((n2+
ml) log2(n)) primitive operations assuming the ORAM accesses are performed
using the Circuit ORAM construction.
7 Realizing the Vision: Challenges and Future Directions
As a step towards realizing the proposed vision, we have designed data-oblivious
algorithms for some of the most widely employed network analysis measures in
the previous section. These can be converted into their equivalent secure multi-
party protocols as discussed in Section 5. However, use of MPC as a practical
solution to analyze DSSNs will require several open questions to be addressed.
7.1 Theoretical Challenges: Designing Efficient MPC Protocols
In the 1980s and 1990s, many generic solutions were proposed for computing any
arbitrary function f securely. Though complete, these solutions cannot be put to
practice attributing to the large overheads in the complexity of the MPC proto-
col over its non-secure variant. A recent methodology adopted for constructing
efficient MPC protocols is to design data-oblivious algorithms. These oblivious
algorithms can be converted into their MPC counterparts using ideal functional-
ities for all the primitive operations assumed in the oblivious algorithm. This ap-
proach has become popular since the introduction of the cryptographic primitive
FORAM for performing efficient RAM model secure computation [19]. The same
methodology is adopted in the current paper to design efficient MPC protocols
for Google PageRank centrality and K-shell decomposition algorithm. Another
lesser explored technique for designing MPC protocols is to make use of the fact
that the output is disclosed in public at the end of an MPC protocol. Hence, one
can design algorithms whose control flow and memory access pattern depends on
the output of the algorithm. This methodology is in contrast to the approach of
designing data-oblivious algorithms, in which case the control flow and memory
accesses of the program depend on nothing but the input length. These pro-
tocols, though not data-oblivious, will still give us secure MPC protocols. This
methodology also brings out the non-equivalence of data-oblivious algorithms
and secure computation protocols. A few works that have followed this partic-
ular approach and harnessed the leakage of output in an MPC protocol include
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the work by Brickell and Shmatikov [31]. Another approach to design secure
MPC protocols could be to harness the security efficiency trade-off. There may
be scenarios where certain aspects of the input data are not sensitive and hence
can be revealed in exchange for making the protocol more efficient. As an exam-
ple, consider a communication network distributedly held by a set of individuals
who wish to securely compute the K-shell decomposition on the distributed net-
work. Hypothetically speaking, one could design MPC protocols that are not
secure and disclose the degree distribution and average shortest path length of
the input graph but are efficient compared to the secure MPC k-shell algorithm.
Such a non-secure protocol can be used in practice, since it is previously known
that the communication network is a small world and has a power law degree
distribution.
7.2 The Implementation Challenge
As a field of cryptography, MPC has been studied for more than three decades.
However, it is recent that MPC protocols have been employed for real world
applications. It was first used in 2008 by Danish farmers to conduct a double
auction for determining the market price of Beetroot [32]. Many implementations
for MPC have been developed, which include Sepia, Sharemind, Fairplay, Tasty,
VIFF and Oblivm. These implementations generally focus on compile-time opti-
mizations, minimizing network communication and ensuring the robustness and
correctness of implemented protocols. Till date MPC has been deployed in only
those scenarios where the number of parties are small, generally two or three.
However, to perform network analysis over a thousand or a million node net-
work distributedly held by a large set of parties will require MPC protocols that
are scalable and whose implementation is not prone to network congestion and
network synchronization issues. Implementing such sizable MPC protocols for a
large number of participants over the Internet has never been done before, and
pose a great challenge for the MPC experts. There is, however, a feasible ap-
proach to handle data from a large set of participants. Here, we assume that the
large number of participants distribute their data among a few external agents
who then follow the MPC protocol on their behalf. Then, the MPC protocol
must be designed by considering the semi-honest or malicious behavior of these
agents rather than the participants.
7.3 The Challenge of Differential Privacy
Designing secure MPC protocols for functions whose input is distributedly held
by a set of parties does not always ensure that the privacy of the involved in-
dividuals is maintained. At times the output of a secure protocol can by itself
partially or completely reveal the private inputs of the parties. For example,
consider a set of 10 individuals who wish to use an MPC protocol to output an
unlabeled isomorphic random graph of the trust network knit on them. If the
output graph has precisely one node with out-degree 3, then the corresponding
individual (with out-degree 3) will be able to identify herself in the isomorphic
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shuffled network, and may even identify her neighbors using some auxiliary in-
formation. As observed in the previous example, the output of an MPC protocol
might reveal some or all of the private inputs of the participants. Hence one
needs to also study which network functions are “safe” to compute. This ques-
tion falls under the domain of differential privacy, which aims at studying: how
to maintain the utility of the output, while ensuring the privacy of the input.
Although differential privacy has been extensively studied on relational data, it
has been sparsely studied for networked data [33]. There have also been instances
where network data has been de-anonymized using some auxiliary information
[34]. Ensuring differential privacy of the networked input data is a much harder
challenge than in the case of relational input data, given the adversary may
have different types of information for de-anonymization, like edges, vertices,
sub-graphs, quasi-identifiers, etc. Therefore, for ensuring the privacy of the indi-
viduals, there is also a need to study which network measures are differentially
private to compute and which are not.
7.4 The Deployment Challenge
Implementing secure, robust and efficient MPC protocols for network analysis
does not guarantee the participation of data holders on whom the network is
knit. Generally, the complex security proofs of MPC are accessible to only a
small set of researchers in cryptography, hence there needs to be an incentive
mechanisms in place, which must ensure that participants share their “true” pri-
vate information with the developed secure application. In the MPC application
deployed in [32], the Danish farmers had their own personal interest in comput-
ing the output of the MPC protocol (i.e. the market price at which they will sell
their crops). However, such incentives may not be present if the MPC protocol
is being employed for research purposes. This can be argued in the case, where
the enmity network over a set of college students has to be analyzed using secure
MPC protocols. In this case the participants will have no incentive to share their
private data (list of enemies) with an MPC application whose sole purpose is
data-analysis of DSSNs for research purposes. Hence, to employ secure network
analysis protocols in practice, a major challenge is to set up certain incentive
mechanisms in place so that people can trust the developed application even
when they do not benefit directly from the output of the MPC protocol.
8 Related Work
Classical graph algorithms in the context of MPC were first studied by Brickell
and Shmatikov in 2006 [31]. The authors proposed secure two party protocols for
computing single source and all pair shortest paths problem. Since then, many
graph algorithms have been explored in the MPC setting, including BFS, DFS,
Dijkstra, minimum spanning tree and classical flow algorithms [35, 36, 12]. Se-
curely constructing an anonymized version of a network distributedly held by a
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set of parties has been previously studied for various security models [37–39].
There exist works that have aimed at designing secure MPC algorithms for
a few network measures. These works have generally been motivated by some
particular application scenario. To employ SNA for criminal investigation, Ker-
schbaum and Schaad [40] propose secure multiparty protocols for closeness and
betweenness centrality measures. They assume a different definition of between-
ness centrality compared to the classical one specified by Brandes [41]). Further-
more, they employ the adjacency matrix graph representation and hence their
protocols are not very efficient for sparse graphs. Kukkala et al. [22] propose se-
cure multiparty protocols for degree distribution, closeness centrality, Pagerank
and K-shell decomposition for the adjacency matrix representation. Employing
the ORAM primitive and the edgelist graph representation, the Pagerank and
K-shell decomposition protocols designed in the current paper asymptotically
outperforms the algorithms in the above work. Asharov et al. [42] study the a
set of centrality measures over multilayer networks distributedly held by a set
of individuals/organizations. They propose information theoretic secure MPC
protocols for distance based centrality measures.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we highlight on the unexplored potential of studying distributed
sensitive social networks. As our vision, we propose the use of the tools and
techniques of multiparty computation to study the network properties of the
distributedly held sensitive networks while ensuring the privacy of involved indi-
viduals. The use of MPC overcomes all the drawbacks of the previously employed
techniques (like surveys, interviews and sampling) for studying distributedly held
networks. We present a list of theoretical, implementation, deployment and dif-
ferential privacy challenges which need to be overcome to realize the proposed
vision. Hence, a thorough investigation of all the network measures including
community detection, degree distribution, betweenness centrality, eigenvector
centrality, etc., in the MPC setting will require the confluence of different do-
mains, including cryptography, security, network science and behavioral psychol-
ogy.
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Appendix
Appendix A Distributed Sensitive Social Networks
In this section we discuss on a set of DSSNs that have most often appeared in
the research literature. For each network, we present its node-edge description,
previous investigations on these networks, and a list of possible analysis that can
be performed on them in future.
Sexual Relationship Network
The network consists of individuals modeled as nodes while the edges between
them denotes the existence of a sexual relationship between the concerned indi-
viduals. This is a completely distributed network which has the highest quotient
of sensitivity compared to other social networks. The works in the literature have
focused on determining network characteristics such as assortativity and show
that positive and negative assortativity induce different spreading patterns in
the network [43]. It has also been observed that some of these networks deviate
from the traditional model of preferential attachment that gives rise to the power
law degree distribution [43]. The data for all the studies conducted so far in the
literature have been gathered through face-to-face interviews, random sampling,
etc that involve a trusted third party [44].
Romantic Relationship Network
Another distributed sensitive social network that models relationships similar to
the sexual relationship network is the romantic relationship networks. It has a
high quotient of sensitivity at 0.85 and is currently available only in the fully
distributed form. The nodes continue to be individuals while the presence of an
edge will denote that the corresponding individuals have dated each other in
the past or are currently dating. Studies on romantic relationships among school
children have shown that nodes that represent romantic partners tend to have
similar structural characteristics such as centrality indexes [45]. However, such a
study is not easy to perform when it comes to workplace romance [46]. Due to the
presence of negative perceptions, workers usually tend to hide their workplace
relationships. However, these relationships are known to influence the workplace
environment and hence are needed to be investigated for a better performance
of the organization. Given the highly debated pros and cons of workplace ro-
mance, the study of this DSSN can throw some light into the dynamics of these
interactions on the work culture.
Informal Networks - Trust and Enmity Networks
Enmity network and trust network are often referred to as informal networks,
given that they model the informal interactions between the employees, which
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is usually inconsistent with the interactions induced by the formal hierarchy of
the organization. These networks model individuals as nodes and the presence
of an edge from node A to node B will denote the feeling of hatred in an enmity
network and trust in a trust network. These networks also fall under the cate-
gory of completely distributed social networks. Unlike the previously considered
networks, the feelings of trust and hatred are not necessarily mutual. Hence the
underlying network is best modeled as a directed graph. The feeling of animosity
between colleagues does not foster a healthy working environment, hence it is
of great interest for the organization to monitor the network of hatred on their
employees. A study of the dynamics of hate relations would also help form more
effective teams and take constructive measures to foster a better environment.
There has not been any work, to the best of our knowledge, that investigates the
enmity network. On the other hand, the importance of the study of the trust
network of employees in an organization has appeared in the literature [2]. There
are instances where the progress of a team has been slow when the leader oc-
cupies a weak position in the trust network of the organizations [47]. There are
third party agencies, like Keyhubs, who offer services to perform workplace so-
cial analytics and allow harnessing the potential of informal networks [48]. They
identify influential employees in the network, unravel the team dynamics and
help bring in a transformation by extracting structural metrics of the informal
network. They collect the data regarding informal networks through surveys,
and hence only act as a data processor on behalf of their clients. Such a method
of analysis boils down to having a trusted third party model, wherein Keyhubs
learns the entire data gathered for analysis.
Supply Chain Network
Supply chain networks is another example of a fully distributed DSSN, where
the nodes represent organizations that are a part of a buyer-seller system and
a directed edge from A to B denotes that A supplies goods/raw materials to
B. Such a network is considered sensitive since organizations do not wish to
disclose their buyer-seller interactions in the fear of compromising competitive
advantage [49]. At the same time, organizations are interested in determining
the importance of the structural position they occupy in the supply chain since
it has been well established that the position of an organization in the supply
chain can greatly determine its influence over the flow of goods/raw materials
in the entire network. There are works in the literature that look at assessing
the risk associated with an organization based on its structural position [50,
49]. This is done by using secure multiparty protocols designed to compute the
betweenness centrality of the nodes in the network.
25
Financial Transaction Network
Financial transaction network is an example of a partially distributed DSSN. As
the name suggests, this network models the financial transactions between the
considered entities. The nodes in the network represent individuals with a bank
account. An edge from A to B will exist in this network if A has initiated more
than a threshold number of transactions to B. One can also model the network
as a weighted network, where the edge weights denote the frequency of trans-
actions between the corresponding nodes. The accounts of the individuals who
are a part of the network may belong to different banks. Each bank has the in-
formation of the transactions initiated by it’s own customers. Hence, each bank
is aware of the partial data (sub-graph) of the complete transaction network.
A preliminary analysis of the topology of the financial transactions network in
Austria has been performed previously [51].
Appendix B Secure Computation and Ideal
Functionalities
B.1 A Introduction to MPC
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) is a sub-field of cryptography that deals
with the design of protocols/algorithms that allows a set of n individuals/parties
P1, P2, . . . , Pn with private inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn to compute a public function
f(x1, x2, . . . , xn). The protocol must be such that the parties don’t learn any
information from the run of the protocol, other than what can be gathered from
the output of the protocol and their respective inputs. The design of the protocol
must also take the behavior of the parties into consideration. As discussed previ-
ously, the behavior of the parties could be termed either as honest or as corrupt.
We define the notion of an adversary in order to model any attack on the protocol
launched by the corrupt parties. The adversary is assumed to control the set of
corrupt parties in the protocol. Instead of modeling corruption of individual cor-
rupt parties, the security of an MPC protocol can be be defined by modeling the
adversary accordingly. For example, the adversary can be assumed to be either
passive or active. A passive adversary can only read the messages sent/received
by the corrupt parties and cannot influence their behavior, whereas, an active
adversary can influence the actions of the corrupt parties during the run of the
protocol. The security of an MPC protocol is defined by comparing the ideal
setting and the real simulation, details of which are described below.
The ideal setting refers to the scenario of computing a functions f where
we assume the existence of a trusted third party TTP , to whom all the parties
P1, P2, . . . , Pn send their private inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn respectively. The TTP
computes the function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn) and sends the desired output to all the
parties. This protocol for computing f in the presence of a TTP is denoted by
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Fpi. The protocol Fpi is termed as the ideal functionality for the protocol pi, where
pi denotes the MPC protocol designed to achieve the secure computation of f .
In the real setting we run the protocol pi, as a part of which the set of parties
P1, P2, . . . , Pn perform computation, exchange messages, make random choices,
etc. The sequence of messages that the party sent/received and the random
choices that the party made during the run of the protocol is defined as the view
of a party. Intuitively, an MPC protocol pi securely computes the function f if
the adversary gains no extra advantage when the function f is computed using
the protocol pi over the its ideal functionality Fpi. In the case of a semi-honest
or a passive adversary, we can formally define security as follows:
Definition 7. (Passively secure MPC protocol)
An MPC protocol pi securely computes a function f if there exist a simulator S
i.e. an efficient probabilistic algorithm which generates the view of the adversary
in the real world given just the input and output of the corrupt parties i.e.
{viewi}Pi∈C ≡ S({xi, yi}Pi∈C)
where C represents the set of corrupt parties and viewi, xi, yi represents the view,
input and output of party Pi respectively.
On similar lines we can define security of MPC protocols for the case of active
adversaries. A more thorough discussion on the security of MPC protocol can
be found in [21].
The efficiency of an MPC protocol is generally measured on the basis of three
criteria, namely, computation, communication and round complexity. The com-
putation complexity accounts for the total computation that all the parties need
to perform before and during the execution of the protocol. The communication
complexity is a measure of the net amount of information exchanged between the
parties. A secure multiparty protocol can be broken down into rounds, such that
those instructions which can be executed in parallel and are independent of each
other are clubbed as a single round of execution. The total number of rounds
employed during the run of the protocol accounts for the round complexity.
B.2 Universal Composability (UC) Framework
For all the secure multiparty protocols designed in the paper, few functionalities/sub-
protocols will be repeatedly used in and across protocols. Hence, we will abstract
out these sub-protocols as a set of ideal functionalities which will be available
as primitive operations. This abstraction is feasible given the UC theorem [20],
which states that a protocol pi1 is secure when composed with a protocol pi2
if the protocol pi1 can be securely implemented when composed with the ideal
functionality Fpi2 . The UC theorems allows us to design protocols using ideal
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functionalities for protocols that are already implemented in the literature. Fur-
ther in this section we will present a set of ideal functionalities which will be
employed for designing secure MPC protocols for network measures.
B.3 Arithmetic Black Box FABB
The arithmetic black box FABB is one of the most primitive ideal functionalities
employed while designing complex MPC protocols. The ideal functionality is
characterized by a ring ZM and it provides the following four operations:
– Store: A party P can store an element a ∈ ZM in the black box by using
the following command:
[a]←P a
The handle [a] is sent to all the parties and the stored value a can be ma-
nipulated using the handle [a].
– Addition: All the parties can securely add (+M ) the values stored at handle
a and b and store the result in the location with the handle c, using the
following command:
[c]← [a] + [b]
– Multiplication: All the parties can securely multiply (∗M ) the values stored
at handle a and b and store the result in the location with the handle c using
the following command:
[c]← [a] ∗ [b]
– Release: A value a stored at handle [a] can be released in public by all the
parties using the following command:
a← [a]
The arithmetic back box FABB has been realized for various security models
using cryptographic primitives like secret sharing [52] and homomorphic en-
cryption [17]. We can further extend this ideal functionality with a few more
commonly used and previously implemented operations. We append the basic
ideal functionality FABB with the following operations:
– Comparison: All the parties can securely compare the values stored at
handle a and b and store 1 or 0 at handle c depending on whether a is
greater than b or not using the following command:
[c]← [a] ?> [b]
– Equality: All the parties can securely check for equality of the values stored
at handle a and b and store 1 or 0 at handle c depending on whether a equals
b or not using the following command:
[c]← [a] ?= [b]
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The extension of the basic arithmetic black box to allow the above mentioned
operations has been well explored in the MPC literature [16]. For the sake of
brevity, we will refer to the extended arithmetic black box as the arithmetic
black box FABB itself.
The exact computation, communication and round complexity associated
with these operation vary depending on the underlying implementation of these
operations. Furthermore, optimization of the complexity of the operations of the
ideal functionality FABB has been a constant area of research [53]. To make the
MPC protocol designed in the paper independent of the implementation of the
above mentioned operations we will evaluate the complexity of each designed
protocol by the number of FABB operations invoked during the run of the pro-
tocol. This will also provide us with a simpler metric to compare the complexity
of the designed MPC protocols with their equivalent non-secure variants.
B.4 Oblivious RAM for Secure Computation FORAM
The oblivious RAM (ORAM) primitive was first introduced by Goldreich and
Ostrovsky in their seminal paper published in 1996 [54]. Consider the scenario
where a client has stored her data on a remote server in an n length array A.
Further, the client wishes to query the block A[i] of the array without leaking the
index i to the server. The ORAM primitive allows the client to access the block
A[i] in time poly.log(n) while ensuring that the memory access pattern of the
array does not leak the index i to the server. Since 1996, the ORAM primitive
has been employed in various domains including data outsourcing [55], secure
processors [56] and secure computation [57]. In the secure computation scenario,
the ORAM primitive has been employed to implement the ideal functionality
FORAM , which provides the following operations:
– Initialization: All the parties can initialize a new n length array in the
FORAM using the following command:
[A]← oram initialize(n)
The handle [A] to the newly initialized array is sent to all the parties.
– Read: All the parties can read the ith block of the array A securely given
[i] using the following command:
[x]← oram read([A], [i])
The handle [x] contains the content A[i].
– Write: All the parties can write the content stored at [x] to the ith block of
the array A securely given [i] using the following command:
oram write([A], [i], [x])
Numerous implementations of FORAM exist where the oram read and oram write
operations mentioned above can be implemented using poly.log(n) operations of
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the FABB [58]. Circuit ORAM designed by Shi et al. [14] is till date the best
known implementation of FORAM . Circuit ORAM allows one to perform the
read and write operations for arbitrary block sizes using only O((log n)2) FABB
operations. The ORAM initialization cost for the Circuit ORAM is O(n(log n)).
For all the protocols designed in the paper the ORAM initialization cost for all
the ORAM array used will be amortized over the set of read/write operations
performed on the ORAM arrays.
B.5 Secure Computation over Rational Numbers
∼
FABB
In numerous network analysis algorithms, computation is performed over frac-
tional values. Since the arithmetic black box FABB has so far only allowed
integral operations on ZM , there is a need to extend the FABB to perform com-
putation over rational numbers. Catrina and Saxena [18] introduced the ideal
functionality
∼
FABB which provides basic arithmetic operations including addi-
tion, multiplication and division over rational numbers in the fixed-point rep-
resentation. A fixed point number has two parts, the integer and the fractional
part separated by the radix point. The ideal functionality
∼
FABB is character-
ized by specifying the number of decimal bits required in the integral and the
fractional part. A rational number will be distinguished from an integer by using
the symbol tilda (∼) over the handle of the variable. The primitive operations
provided by the ideal functionality
∼
FABB are specified below:
1. Store [
∼
a]←P ∼a
2. Addition [
∼
c ]← [∼a] + [
∼
b ]
3. Multiplication [
∼
c ]← [∼a] ∗ [
∼
b ]
4. Division [
∼
c ]← [∼a]/[
∼
b ]
5. Comparison [
∼
c ]← [∼a] ?> [
∼
b ]
6. Equality [
∼
c ]← [∼a] ?= [
∼
b ]
7. Release
∼
a ← [∼a]
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